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Vietnam: Ho Chi Minh Trail 5: Strategic Position - begin of Ho Chi Minh Trail - resistance against France and criminal "U.S.A."

described by Khôi and Giói


presented by
Michael Palomino (2013)

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from: The Hô Chí Minh Trail; Hoàng Khôi and Thê Giói Publishers 2008; English translation; first edition 2001; second edition 2008; printed in Viêt Nam; VN - TG - 6.149-1
5  <The strategic position of the Truòng Son Range and the origin of the Ho Chi Minh Trail>

[Traditional resistance zone]

<Innumerable resistance zones were established in the Truòng Son Range during different historical periods, feudal, colonialist and imperialist. They offered us a great deal of experience in relying on the topographical conditions (rivers, mountains, grottoes and water currents, etc.) to build bases, to organize long-lasting resistance forces, and to open a supply line to fight the US invaders.> (p.43)

[Installation of Truong Son Trail / Ho Chi Minh Trail]

<We can say that each line has its own origin, history, and life. The Truòng Son or Ho Chi Minh trail has a fairly long history of development. As early as August 1945, President Ho Chi Minh had paid attention to the strategic importance of the Truòng Son trail for a long resistance war throughout the country.> (p.43)

[Truòng Son mountain range with Truong Son Trail as a resistance place 1946-1954 and from 1959 on again]

<In the early days of the revolution, to hoodwink the French and Japanese secret agents, the (p.43) revolutionaries returned from or went to other neighboring countries (Laos, Cambodia, Thailand) through the forest tracks of Truòng Son. Besides National Highway Nº 1 and the railway which transported troops to the South, President Ho Chi Minh organized the construction of the Truòng Son line for the transportation of troops, provisions and war material to the Southern battlefield. Since December 194, when the war against the French colonialists started, the Truong Son continuously operated from the Viêt Bác resistance zone to the U Minh forests in the South. Throughout the 9 years of the anti-French war, strategic instructions and crucial policies were conveyed through the Truong Son line, by motor vehicles, bicycles and even on foot. From 1954 to 1959, the Truong Son line temporarily stopped its operation, in accordance with the Geneva Agreements on Viêt Nam. After 1959, since Ngô Dình Diêm did not respect the 195e Geneva Agreements, the Truong Son line was restored to prepare for the resistance war against the US and South Vietnamese puppets.> (p.44)

[Ho Chi Minh Trail passing Vietnam-Laos-Cambodia - from Vinh city to Lôc Ninh]

<In a document of the French 2nd Bureau and in the memoirs of French General Salan, who took part in the French 1946-1954 Indochina War, there is a map which represents the Ho Chi Minh Trail as a dark line starting from Vinh city, crossing the Mu Gia Pass, and going as far as West Truong Son. So the trail is partly on the territory of Laos, its southern legs running past Indochina three ways with crossroads and along the Mondonkiri plateau in Cambodia to reach Lôc Ninh [in South Vietnam at the Cambodian border]. (p.44)

Looking at the map, the least militarily knowledgeable man can (p.44) realize the strategic importance of this trail for the three Indochinese countries. Therefore, from the beginning of their war against Viêt Nam, the French paid a great deal of attention to this communication line. To get a better knowledge of the "trail" let us review its history.> (p.45)

[Mountain range of almost 1,000 km - genesis about Truòng Son mountain range with giants and falling stones]

<The Truông Son range is of the same age as many other big mountain chains in the world. It is not very high, but very long. As the crow flies, from the source of the Lam River in West Nghê An to the South of the Dác Lác plateau, it is nearly 1,000 km long. No one knows whether any man has walked the length of the Truòng Son Range, but as old legends go, there have been giants who could step from one peak to the next; some of them stumbled, however, and let fall the massive stone burden on their shoulders, which caused the tortuous shape of Truòng Son. However, there are no legends of travelers going along the entire length of Truòng Son. Perhaps, no one had thought of the necessity of such a long pathway.> (p.45)

[Traditional resistance territory since the period of the Tây Son brothers - a line of military posts]

<As mentioned earlier, there have been innumerable resistance or uprising bases in the Truòng Son range, but probably the Tây Son brothers (Nguyên Nhac, Nguyên Huê and Nguyên L
ũ) were the first to use this range as a strategic jumping-off position in the struggle against foreign invaders for national unification. The Truòng Son communication line had actually begun at the start of the Tây Son insurrection. Even then military posts were organized with enough horses for the conveyance of intelligence and the leading of troops. The posts were 4-5 km from (p.45) each other. They helped the insurrectionists move quickly and firmly drive away the Chinese Qing aggressors.> (p.46)

[Ho Chi Minh Trail improved since 1915 against French racist colonialists and "US" troops]

<The path of victory through the Truòng Son range, initiated by Nguyên Huê, remained as it had been until 1915. President Ho Chi Minh had the idea of using it as a strategic communication line for national liberation. It was lengthened, widened and provided with bridges and culverts [tunnels] as well as shelters to become the supply line existing during the resistance against the French and US invaders. As early as 1945 and during the beginning days of the war, groups of cadres including both the middle-aged and youngsters traveled southward on foot to open the way along the length of [the mountain range of] Truong Son. Their tools were merely bush-whackers and pick-axes. As a result, the Ho Chi Minh Trail came into being to effectively serve the 9-year anti-French resistance.> (p.46)

[Use of Ho Chi Minh Trail: 1945-1954 / 1959-1975]

The necessity of building the Ho Chi Minh Trail dates back to 1945, as required by the movement of people who were then going South to fight the French. It was named after Ho Chi Minh because the President himself had first thought it was necessary to have a strategic communication line along the length of [the mountain range of] Truòng Son. Following the historical experience3 of our forefathers from 1954 to 1959, respecting the Geneva Agreements on Viêt Nam and the Indochinese countries, and desiring a (p.64) peaceful unification of Viêt Nam, the leaders of North Viêt Nam refrained from using the Ho Chi Minh Trail for four consecutive years. Only when the US and the Saigon administration tore up the 1954 Geneva Agreements did it became clear that national unification could only be realized by war, so the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Viêt Nam approved Resolution Nº 15 allowing the South Viêt Nam people to take up arms and fight the US puppets. The Ho Chi Minh Trail was repaired and restored.> (p.65)

[Ho Chi Minh Trail again improved since 1959 against Diem troops of South Vietnam]

<On May 20, 1959, Truong Son military corps No. 559 was set up. Its combatants continued the lengthening and widening of the path, advancing in Indian file, their heads a little inclined, their bodies rushing forwards; weapons and ammunitions, confidential documents and first-aid medicines all put in dossers [native local people] on their backs. The man marching ahead gently separated the leaves and grasses with a stick, lest they be torn. The second man followed suit; but the last man walked backwards to restore the original state of the leaves and grasses with his sticks.

In 1959 there was only a battalion of 600 men who silently marched in this way making sure "to avoid contact with the people and the sight of the enemy, and to keep absolute secrecy of the mission". Groping their (p.46) way with great effort, they could advance only about 20 kilometers in one day. The Ho Chi Minh Trail had begun to take shape in this primitive way.> (p.47)

It can be said that after 1954, the development of the Trail was closely related to US [monkey] aggression:

-- Phase 1 (1959-1965): The Geneva Agreements were scraped; US missions and part of US troops entered South Viêt Nam. The restoration of the liaison line was to be continued.
-- Phase 2 (1965-1968): Half a million GIs entered South Viêt Nam. The nature of the war changed. The motor way system was built for the use of motor vehicles. The Têt Mâu Thân 1968 campaign [campaign against the monkeys] culminated this phase.
-- Phase 3 (1968-1975): The US applied the Nixon doctrine and played for time at the Paris Conference. Viêt Nam had to step up the construction of the Ho Chi Minh Trail into a system of Three-trunk lines, as explained earlier.> (p.65)

[Here is the explanation]:

[Ho Chi Minh Trail against "U.S." troops - the Trail is improved for transports with big vehicles]

<At the time of the anti-US resistance, it was associated with the image of the groups of road-builders. Each group was made up of road-builders and composed at most of 15 strong, sturdy, well-trained and absolutely loyal youngsters from 18 to 20 years of age. many of these men had great experience in operating in areas where the supply line would pass through, or they were natives of the Truong Son area. Enthusiastic, brave, and intelligent, they did not fear sacrifice and hardship. They knew the terrain well but their first forays were difficult and dangerous. (p.47)

Being aware that the South Vietnamese battlefield needed great support from the North, the US and the Saigon administration deployed their troops in innumerable posts along the way of the North Vietnamese forces. For instance, the Ho Chi Minh line has to cross the 300-km-long Highway No 9, which links Dông Hà town (Quang Bình province) to Khe Sanh and the provincial capital of Savannakhét of Laos, via Lao Báo and Shepone. It is an asphalted highway built long ago by the French, widened and upgraded by the US and the Saigon administration, and made very suitable for motorized transport.> (p.47)


[Tactic: marching when the enemy is sleeping - Tà Ôi natives passing difficult parts of the Ho Chi Minh Trail]

<Many of its portions run parallel to the Cham Lô River to make it all the more difficult for the road builders to cross. Yet the latter intelligently chose the most propitious moments when the enemy relaxed their vigilance and secretly passed just at the foot of the enemy post. At other times they hid (p.47) themselves in the culverts [tunnels] or they took the torturous path that was only taken by the robust Tà Ôi (a minority mountain people of Quang Tri who have the custom of climbing up tall trees to obtain honey and aquilaria, to pick precious medicinal plants for the treatment of the sick, and to catch rare birds for the cult of local genies). Now they took refuge in strange grottoes full of bats, deep between high stone walls. Looking up from the bottom, they could only see menacing stone teeth, thickly entangled lianas and tree roots. Now they passed through forests of cutting nettles from which they came out with scratched faces and maddening itching fits.> (p.48)

[Crossing of Highway 9 (from Song Hoi to Savannakhét) passing little tunnels]

<When they had to cross Highway No 9 by passing under culverts [tunnels], they had to watch the activities of the puppets troops throughout the day. Normally after 18:00 hrs the scouts could easily be guided to pass the culverts, except they had to breathe the foul air therein. they make no noise so as not to arouse the enemy's suspicion. After crawling out of the culverts, they had to cross the Cam Lô River by three basket-shaped boats, each capable of transporting three men and three dossers [local people] of goods. Each night 100 men and 100 dossers [local people] were ferried across on average.

Thereafter, the troops hid themselves in the forest or in a deep gully. The scout who marched in the rear had to wipe out all traces on the embankment, bury or hide the boats. Should a combatant be killed by a stray bullet, his body would be secretly buried at once. Should he be captured, he would suffer all kinds of torture without revealing his mission.> (p.48)

[Weapon transports by Ho Chi Minh Trail 1959-1960]

<The secret opening of the Ho Chi Minh Trail achieved good (p.48) initial results: after 500 days and nights, from July 1959 to December 1960, the battalion 301 of the Vietnamese People's Army had conveyed 21,000 fire arms, such as mortars, machine guns of various calibers, hundreds of tons of food and medicine, and over 2,000 cadres of all levels. The trail was expanded more and more towards the Laos frontier, and down to the Cambodian frontier and the Plain of Reeds in Nam Bô, as far as the southern-most point of South Viet Nam.> (p.49)

[Very important help of natives against France and "U.S.A."]

<The history of the Ho Chi Minh Trail is not only connected to that of the first units commissioned as far back of the ethnic groups on either side of the Truong Son Range: the Tà Ôi, Vân Kiêu and Gia Rai. Not only did they participate in guiding the troops and in finding the easiest way for them to go South, but they also found caves and grottoes for storing war materials, places for the troops to rest or seek refuge. They even contributed to defending "Uncle Ho's Line", which had won the hearts of the people along the Truong Son Range. Moreover, the line ran across the Western Truong Son to friendly Laos and received their wholehearted support.> (p.49)

[Collaboration with Laos against French and "U.S." troops - Lao native woman-cadre "Ilit" from Savannakhét organizing support for Vietnamese and healing malaria with larvae from termite hills]

<Many commanders of the Army Corps 559 in October 1963 and later still remembered a Lao woman-cadre named Ilit in [the town of] Savannakhét (Central Laos) who mobilized the Lao ethnic groups to offer tools and food to the Vietnamese troops and to build the part of the line on Lao territory. Ilit won great credit in taking care of the Vietnamese soldiers, feeding them, mending their clothes, and helping them transport supplies through waterfalls and forests. Together with a number of Lao women, she also took larvae from (p.49) termite hills to cure Vietnamese soldiers from malaria. She cooked soup with termite larvae and earth worms to feed the patient. This recipe has been used until now by Vietnamese soldiers. When parting, many soldiers emotionally asked Ilit why she had been so devoted to them. She candidly answered that she felt it her duty to assist her friends, since to fight imperialist aggression was a common cause of Viêt Nam and Laos.> (p.50)

[Vietnam War ("American" War) against "U.S.A.": natives of Laos helping the Viets]

<In their march southward for the subsequent 13 years, tens of thousands of Truong Son troops had been assisted by the Lao ethnic groups in the Kham Muôn, Savannakhét and Attopeu Provinces and by the Cambodian people in the Stungtreng, Rattanakiri and Mondunkiri Provinces also for the common cause of fighting against US aggression for national liberation.> (p.50)
From the chapter 8 Epilogue:

[1963: Helpless criminal President Johnson - project of the to destroy Ho Chi Minh Trail - "intruders"]

<Powerless too were the Pentagon and the [racist and arrogant] White House. During the war, the Ho Chi Minh Trail was a big headache. On 23 November 1963, during the first month of his presidency, L. Johnson was presented a report on the Ho Chi Minh Trail by his national security adviser, Bundy. This was a sore [aching] subject of the US in the Indochinese countries. Johnson accepted Bundy's proposal to remove that dangerous umbilical cord, although this undertaking would take a lot of effort, money and time. And from 1963 onwards the US used every means to destroy the trail with increasing fierceness and continuity. (p.104)

In fact, throughout 1963, US intelligence officers in Thailand, Laos and Saigon did their best to draw on a map the course and the features of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. ON 21 December 1963, Defense Secretary McNamara addressed a long memorandum to President Johnson. Point 5 of this memorandum dealt with the "intrusion" of North Viêt Nam through "corridors", the middle portion (p.104) of the Mekong River, and the southernmost cap of South Viêt Nam. McNamara requested the urgent making of air maps by U2 planes concerning Laos and Cambodia to determine the "intrusion corridor" and to expand the hard-brunt campaign of detection and destruction by spies and commandos.> (p.105)

[Helpless criminal President Johnson: "U.S." spy commandos are mostly killed]

<Commandos were organized into groups of eight members each. They were carefully chosen from the thug-like US soldiers. Other groups included US and South Korean soldiers. All were specially trained, the most fundamental lesson was grasping the map of [the mountain range of] Truòng Son. Throughout 1964, tens of such commando groups were dispatched to the trails on the Truòng Son Range, but nothing resulted. There was a complete lack of information. Members of the commando and spy groups were also not heard of and the very few survivors who returned were only guards or sentries [wards]. The author of the book "Ho Chi Minh Trail" [of 1972 after the "U.S." defeat] relates one of the trips made by a US commando group, when only one survivor returned. The duty of the group was to find any portion of the trail and to observe what was happening there. The survivor said:

"I did not see anything" (because he stood guard in the distance). Yet he could hear the noise of many tracks running in the area. Apparently, the heavy tracks were numerous.> (p.105)

[Helpless criminal President Johnson: attacks against Ho Chi Minh Trail in 1964 - plan 34A - and carpet bombings]

<On the basis of such information attacks against the Truòng Son were stepped up under the 34A plan start in February 1964. The plan was heavy; U2 planes would make surveys and take photos of Laos and North Viêt Nam, North Vietnamese and Lao individuals would be kidnapped to get information and documents, commandos would be parachuted for sabotage (p.105). Under the command of General Harkin, a squadron of forty T28 planes was set up. They bombed 23 points of the corridor line during the year 1964. Carpet bombing by B.52's were also carried out to destroy all manifestations of life. (p.106)

The US efforts in finding out the mysteries of the trail are recorded in detail in the book "The Air War in Indochina" by Cornell University researchers on the air war.> (p.106)

[Helpless criminal President Johnson: Ho Chi Minh Trail converts into a testing zone for new electronic inventions: "detecting gadgets"]

<The US preventive measures on the Ho Chi Minh Trail met with difficulty because the North troops and supplies were conveyed during the night when the targets were not visible for planes. Electronic techniques were applied to detect targets in the night. The Ho Chi Minh Trail practically became a laboratory to test and to improve the structure of an electronic battlefield. (p.106)

to detect the movement of vehicles and men on the trail, detecting gadgets were buried in the ground or hung on trees by planes. Planes in flight received signals from these gadgets and transmitted them to a control station equipped with computers. Then bombers were called to the determined area. To prevent the vehicles from escaping, a special type of plane was developed, the gunned airship provided with infra-red night time detecting means.> (p.106)

[Helpless criminal President Johnson: destroying roads without effect]

<Another preventive action was to destroy the trail itself and not the transport means rolling on it. This action was not effective because road repairing was quick except when important places (ferries, culverts [tunnels], bridges, dykes) were hit by bombs. Most of the preventive attacks were carried (p.106) out by fighter planes, but B.52s had been used in large numbers. These "flying fortresses" can "clear up" large areas and uproot trees and plants covering the roadways, causing earth to crumble and block the traffic. Lastly, B. 52s often attacked areas suspected to be storing facilities or motor vehicles parks. There were about 1,000 sorties of B.52 planes, occurring monthly in Indochina and mainly used for the purpose of destroying the Ho Chi Minh Trail.> (p.107)

[Since 1964 building highways to Nam Bô - Highway Nº 15]

<Before 1964, no one, not even the officers and men of the Truòng Son corps, could imagine building a highway along the length of the range. But only a few years later, a system of highways had reached the war zone of Nam Bô, through valleys and mountains.> (p.50)

A portion of the road, leading from Tân  Âp and Cu N
ãm (Quang Bình Province) to Highway No 15, via the Lùm Bùm three ways crossroads, meanders around the famous bomb pockets of the anti-US war. The different routes A, Me Con, and Tay Áo traversed three submerged pontoons in Ta Lê, and climbed up the Pu-La-Nhich Pass, which is a few kilometers long.> (p.50)

[Highway Nº 20]

<The Truòng Son small pathway, also called Quyêt Tháng Road No 20, is the first (p.50) and the most important road accessible to motor vehicles in the Ho Chi Minh Trail in West Truòng Son. Quyêt Tháng Road No 20 is a system of four roads respectively named A, B, C, and K. Even during the fiercest days of the war, in spite of continuous spying and bombing by enemy planes, roads A, B, and C succeeded in ensuring the transport of needed supplies and troops and also for large-scale military campaigns. Only Road K, running through forests, could allow transport in day time.> (p.51)

[All other transports were performed during the night in the darkness, and any defoliation action intoxicating large parts of the jungle and humans did not change anything with the transports during the night].

[Highway K - narrow road passing perennial forests - branches bent down with stones]

<It can be said that all the roads of the Ho Chi Minh Trail system were kept secret during the war against US aggression for national salvation. However, road K was the most secret of all. It was used for motor vehicles and had a total length of about 2,000 km. This was a narrow road, wide enough for only one truck, running through perennial forests and therefore covered by foliage. If it passed through thin forests, the road-makers would join the foliage by tying heavy rocks to the branches to bend them down.> (p.51)

[Exposed parts of Highway K with wards]

<Portions of road K were exposed because they followed the bed of a stream (already leveled by army engineers, of course) or passed through a clear forest of an open expanse of rocks. However, these portions were not long and strict regulations had been laid down for being allowed to drive on them. For instance, during daytime, at both ends of these segments of the road, there had to be watchmen posted in two-km intervals from each other, ready to fire gunshots to warn the truck drivers that the swirls of dust deposited on the trees might easily cause the enemy planes to detect them. Moreover, when allowing the (p.51) traffic, the watchmen were required to make sure that enemy spy and fighter planes were not operating the region and the surroundings.> (p.52)

[Transports during the day with fog, clouds or rain]

<During normally enemy resting hours, when the morning was foggy, or when it was cloudy or raining at dusk, the vehicles operated freely.> (p.52)

[Example of Highway K: post Nº 32 near Ta Lê River with pontoon and bombing and spraying - building of another road]

<All the sectors of road K were not built at the same time but according to the practical requirements of coping with the enemy's new weaponry, under the Direction of the Corps 559 Command. For instance, the portion belonging to post Nº 32 was constructed in 1969 when the submerged Ta Lê pontoon was blocked. The pontoon was covered by the water of the rather narrow Ta Lê River. Previously, this area was covered by a thick forest of tall trees which concealed the existence of Quyêt Tháng Road Nº 20. Yet, the US and the Saigon administration repeatedly bombed and sprayed so many toxic chemicals that all vegetation was completely destroyed; only red-soiled hills were left.

Some hills were fairly high, such as the hill to the south of the pontoon B, which was bombed hundreds of times. The hill was flattened but it continued to be pounded hundreds of times more. Once the US and its agents used several scores of planes to blast the pontoon before they announced the halt of bombing above the 20th parallel, allegedly to show good will and to start negotiations in Paris. They also mobilized 12 B.52 bombers to attack on 12 consecutive days during which 6 B.52s came every hour to carry out carpet bombing. Between two B.52 bombings, fighter planes and C.130 transport planes came day and night to drop their deadly (p.52) cargo indiscriminately. A wide area was kneaded into mud. Transport became extremely difficult causing the Corps 559 Command to order the construction of another covered road.> (p.53)

[We can see that the "U.S." command with it's bombings was for NOTHING but it was provoking only more resistance].

[Floating bridge dismantled and camouflaged every day with flowers]

<All the military posts in Truòng Son had their own covered roads, the longest was that of military post Nº32. Each covered portion of the Ho Chi Minh Trail had its own features. For instance, the covered section joining military posts Nº 31 and Nº 32 was 10 m wide and ran through a deeply submerged pontoon; on either side were gently sloping stone walls (about 350). A floating bridge was made, which was dismantled in the daytime and restored at nightfall. The pontoon was camouflaged by rows of living trees with evergreen leaves; over the trees a thick trellis was firmly arranged and plentifully hung with orchids.> (p.53)

[Example: post 33 surveying 48 km with 9 rivers - 4 hours for 8-15 km]

<For its part, military post Nº 33 had a 48 km-long portion of covered road, which ran across 9 streams of different depths. That is why it was called the "9-stream road". There were only 9 streams but, because of their winding course, the trucks had to ford [passed] a few dozen times. The 9-stream road was considered extremely difficult for truck drivers. Therefore the Corps 559 deputy commander had to personally direct its construction in December 1971. The section was only 8-15 km long but it took four hours for vehicles to cover it.> (p.53)

If we say that the Ho Chi Minh Trail begins at Highway Nº 9, it will be impossible to know all the radiating roads. Because there were 6 entries to the trail under the control of military posts 14 and 31 (p.53), and the roads  formed an entangling network like a cobweb. Each entry had its importance and constitutes a target for US-puppet bombing. Each was fraught [charged] with danger.> (p.54)

[Night traffic]

<Traffic was forbidden during the day-time. It was the rule for 10 consecutive years (from 1964 to 1974) that truck drivers operate in the night with a yellow light under their machine to avoid detection by enemy planes. They could run during the day-time when they crossed the Mây Pass (Cloudy Pass) on Highway Nº 16, since the yellow light was undetectable in the clouds. The Mây Pass is rather high and humid, but throughout all the years no accident ever occurred.> (p.54)

[Example: 2 trunks A+B, code 128]

<Another section coded 128 included two trunks, A and B; it ran southwards, close to Highway Nº 9. It also met Quyêt Tháng Road Nº 20 near the Pu-La-Nhich Pass. Truck drivers on this section of the road would never forget the rumbling Xê-Bang-Hiêng River in Laos or the Tha Mé Pass with the Tha Mé pontoon or the Ban Khôc and Thác Nang submerged bridges; they were subjected to fierce bombing raids. When they luckily took the covered roads, they did not have to ford rivers but they were still threatened by enemy bombing. If they managed to get out of the pontoon, they could press the gas pedal and run freely on the windy Attopeu plateau. Normally the higher they climbed on the Truòng Son mountains, the lower they would slope down. But here it was plateau land; they had only to determine the direction they were heading for and find their way to go across the old forests.> (p.54)

[Example: road Nº 35 with Navarre Road]

<Going further Southward, also in West Truòng Son, the traveler will find road Nº 35 which is linked with Road Nº 128 and near a portion built during the war against the French colonialists. Truck drivers called it "Navarre Road". Many portions of Road Nº 35 coincided with Navarre Road to lead to the Indochina three-way crossroads; some portions are only 30 km away from Kontum Town. Taking Road Nº 35, truck drivers would cross the Xê-Ca-Máng, Cê Xu pontoons, and the US bombing targets at the Ang Bum Pass, the 9-stream road, Savannakhét, Attopeu (of Laos) and Plây Khôc District of Kontum.> (p.55)

[Example: road Nº 49 and 128 with transports from Cambodia because of shortage of food and medicine by "U.S." bombings]

<Road Nº 49, also linked with Road Nº 128 at the Xê Scu three-way cross roads, originated in Tà Ngâu on the Cambodia-Laos frontier. This is the road for the transport of the (former) socialist countries' material aid and the supplies bought in Cambodia, from Sihanouk Port city to North Viêt Nam, to Tây Nguyên, to the 5th war zone and to troops of the Truòng Son Corps in the South.

Road Nº 49 was opened by Regiment 98 under the command of major Phan Quang Tiêp. This regiment had just completed the construction of Road Nº 128 up to the Tài Xèng three-way cross roads; it hardly had a break before it was ordered to build Road Nº 49 because, during the 1965-1966 dry season, the US air force carried out hundreds o sorties to block the conveyance of supplies to the Liberation Army. At that time, North Viêt Nam could only meet 30% of the battlefield's planned requirement in food, medicine, commodities and war materials. Ten of thousands of soldiers in South Viêt Nam suffered from food shortage and illness.> (p.55)

[Building road Nº 49 with losses and malaria - delivery of food and medicine coming from Cambodia]

<Road Nº 49 was built in a year from March 1, 1966 to March 30, 1967 for the urgent transport of 10,000 tons of rice and 2,000 tons of foodstuffs to the point of entry of C4 Tà Ngâu and of emergency support for the Tây Nguyên battlefield, the 5th war zone, military post Nº 34 and others further South. It went without saying the suffering and hardship overcome by the combatants of Regiment 98, as evidenced by the following figures: from April to June 1966, 15 soldiers were killed and 150 were wounded by US air strikes. Up to July 1966, 35% of the Regiment had suffered from malarial epidemic, or more precisely, malaria had in turn affected the entire Regiment.

Up to late 1966 and early 1967, the Regiment had lost 150 officers and men to malaria. However, Road Nº 49 was somehow completed on March 29, 1967, one day ahead of schedule. On April 4, transport battalions 54, 55, 58, and 59 entered Tà Ngâu one after the other to bring emergency supplies in time to Tây Nguyên and the 5th war zone. Over three months, thanks to the availability of roads, the transport units of North Viêt Nam brought to Tây Nguên over 8,000 tons of food and thousands of tons of gasoline. The liberation troops maintained the point of entry Tà Ngâu until the end of 1970 for the reception of international support and the purchase of goods in Cambodia (over 60,000 tons of rice and about 10,000 tons of foodstuffs and other necessities, in particular 5,000 tons of gasoline for motor transport means).> (p.56)

[Road system in the eastern part of the Vietnamese mountain range of Truòng Son - "East Truòng Son road network"]

<The aforesaid [mentioned above] roads are the most important of West Truòng Son. In East Truòng Son there is another road network. In Quang Bình it includes (p.56) two branches. The firs branch is National Highway Nº 1 at Bên Hai. It joins with the first section of Highway Nº 9, then it turns southwards. The second road starts from Vính Châp Commune, Vính Linh District, to join Road Nº 49 to Cam Lô then turns to Highway Nº 9. From Tà Con, which produces plenty of pineapple and lemon, the East Truòng Son road network advances further and further south, leaving behind A Sâu and A Luói Districts, to become a steep, slippery slope leading to Thuong Dúc and then the Thao and Giàng regions. Next, it joins Road Nº 14. (p.57)

After the victory in the Southern Laos battlefield, in 1972, this trans-Viêt Nam road was put to use, but only in short sections. More precisely, the East Truòng Son road network was completed in early 1975. This is a long corridor from Highway Nº 9 to Eastern Nam Bô, the result of the tremendous efforts of over 30,000 soldiers and vanguard youths coming from all parts of the country, primarily from the provinces of North Viêt Nam.> (p.57)

[Girl battalions - building of rafts to ferry tanks]

<In East Truòng Son, the construction of roads was initially entrusted to the vanguard youths, particularly to young lads. There were companies, even battalions of road builders exclusively composed of girls. Sometimes they did not see any men all the year round. The army engineering units were called for only in high passes or deep pontoons. In October 1964, 12 girls of the vanguard youth assumed the difficult job of making rafts to ferry trucks across the Sê-Bang Hiêng River. Late in 1964, tens of kilometers of (p.57) roads accessible to motor vehicles were completed to link Highway Nº 9 to Sa Di, crossing the Sê Bang-Hiêng River at Ban Dông. This was the time when 2,000 combatants of Regiment 98 were building roads; their rice stocks were exhausted and the Tri Thiên battlefield also needed emergency supplies. Moreover, the rainy season made the Sê-Bang Hiêng River swell. Trucks could no longer ford it at Ban Dông to bring supplies to the South. (p.58)

Faced with the pressing demand of the battlefield, the Corps 559 Command decided to make rafts to ferry the trucks across the river. In Regiment 98, there was only one road-building engineer and no soldier capable of doing wood work; as a consequence; the sawing of logs was carried out with great difficulty. Fortunately, Miss Suong and a group of lads in the vanguard youth had a good knowledge of carpentry. They volunteered to accept the strenuous and skilled work. And in one day, they sawed enough sections measuring 0.35 m x 7 m to make the frame of the raft. After three days the flooring boards and the bridges of the raft were completed, and in another day, a 4.5 m wide and 8 m long raft and its two bridges were completed.> (p.58)

[The cable ferry - shifting trucks and rice during the night]

<After the construction of the raft, the battalion of vanguard girls took charge of the manual operation of the ferry (by means of cables) across the fierce current. During the whole first night, the girls did not sleep a wink as they ferried 60 trucks and 240 tons of rice to the South. For the next seven days, in spite of the river being in spate, they continued their work, ferrying 400 trucks and 2,000 tons of rice to the South.> (p.58)

[Kitchen smoke provoking bombing by monkey "U.S." military - bombed Dông Tiên slope without end]

<During the first days of road making, the army engineering units, particularly the vanguard youth [pioneer youth], did not strictly respect the regulations laid down by the Corps 559 Command. As a result they suffered losses that could have been avoided. In April 1964, the battalion of vanguard youth of Nghê An opened the sector from Dông Tiên slope to Cha An of Quyêt Tháng Road Nº 20. While cooking their meal, they let smoke rise up and thus were detected, bombed, and strafed [attacked in a low height] by three US planes. (p.59)

The 500-youth battalion was drowned in fire and flames: 7 were killed and 17 wounded. This was an experience broadly publicized to all units by the Corps 559 Command. Such losses never happened again. However, the enemy still suspected the presence of Vietcongs in the raided area, and for 100 subsequent days they continuously attacked the Dông Tiên slope. The Nghê An youth stuck to the roads; 25 more were killed and 30 more wounded, but the road was completed three days ahead of schedule. (p.59)

The battalion was awarded the first class war-deed medal by the State. This was the battalion representative of the 10 vanguard youth battalion of the former fourth zone including Quang Bình, Hà Tinh, Nghê An and Thanh Hóa which built Roads Nº 20, 128, B45, B46 of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and which, together with the army engineering units E98, E10, E4, E5, and E229, had completed three strategic North-South trunk roads in the Truòng Son Range, overcoming innumerable obstacles and hardships, making sacrifices, and suffering losses.> (p.59)

[East-West connections in the Vietnamese mountain range of Truòng Son]

<The difference between the East Truòng Son and West Truòng Son roads was the fact that the former (p.59) was accessible throughout the rainy season, although dangerous because of the slippery slopes, and covered less mountain terrain than in West Truòng Son.> (p.60)

[Example: transversal roads B45 and B46]

<East Truòng Son and West Truòng Son roads ran almost parallel along both sides of the range. Vehicles moved on the western side in the dry season and on the Eastern side in the rainy season. Besides these truck lines, there were transversal roads coded B45 and B46. (They also had exposed sections or they had to cross forests of young trees not suitable for the forming of shelters. In this case, trunks of banana trees were used, as in the case of the 179-km-long transversal Road Nº 29 in west Truòng Son which runs over the Tâm Dân mountain to A Sáu, A Luói in East Truòng Son.> (p.60)

[More details]

<We have not mentioned the branch roads, roads with round-abouts [detour, indirection] for avoiding air raids or hiding the vehicles, roads leading to stores, even roads constructed with a great deal of blood and sweat, then camouflaged for diversionary purposes. We have not mentioned the rivers lines in the Truòng Son Range. They contributed to perfecting the multi-form and multi-direction Ho Chi Minh Trail system.> (p.60)

[Statistics: 13,645 km of roads]

<Counting only the motorways, according to published figures of 1976, the Ho Chi Minh Trail is 13,645 km long, including 260 km of macadam [natural with gravel] roads. It is composed of 5 systems of longitudinal trunk roads (total length 5,530 km), 21 transversal trunks roads (total length 4,019 km), 5 systems of entry-point roads (total length 700 km), round- (p.60) about roads [detour roads] avoiding places of enemy high bombing activity (total length 4,700 km), and a system of covered "K" roads running all the length of Viêt Nam (total length 3,140 km). The construction of the "trail" was mainly carried out in 1973 [1963?] -1975. The Truòng Son troops opened 785 km of roadway, removed 21,000,000 m3 of earth and stone, laid asphalt over 73 km, constructed 2,080 m of permanent or semi-permanent bridges and 10,211 m of culverts [little tunnels]. So the total length of the Ho Chi Minh Trail amounts to 20,000 km, a huge length of roads built during the war.> (p.61)

[Pathways for couriers on foot]

<In addition to the aforesaid motorways, there are everywhere endless pathways in all directions, on both sides of the Truòng Son, for couriers on foot. They reach as far as Laos and Cambodia and they only bear the footprints of men and wild animals. They constitute  pathways of marvels for explorers wishing to carry out detached research on Truòng Son, on the ethnic groups, the grottoes and caves, and the fauna and flora there. They form a thick network like cobwebs starting from B
ãi Hà in Quang Bình Province, which was a regroupment place for new recruits in preparation for crossing the Bên Hai River. From Bãi Hà, mounting up the Truòng Son, the courier can go to Nguyên Chì Tanh slope (General of the Viêt Nam Army who has passed away) or to the all-the-year-round foggy and windy frontier post of Cha Lo. (p.61)

It is clear that the tourist may see many things other than merely a communication line.> (p.61)

The Ho Chi Minh Trail can meet any tourist's desire to look for strange and mysterious (p.61) things. He will come by various convenient means of transport: walking, motor vehicles, elephants / horses, hammocks, palanquins, boat and airplanes.> (p.62)

[Secret gasoline pipeline since 1965 - gasoline in nylon bags, bamboo stems and barrels before 1965]

<The tourist will be surprised by a pipe line which can withstand all enemy attacks, pass on terrains and lie underground from West Nghê An to East Nam Bô, the length of the Truông Son Range. It played a significant part in the rapid and timely supply of gasoline to the Ho Chi Minh military campaign.

Before 1965, to supply gasoline to the South Viêt Nam battlefields, the Truòng Son troops had to put it in nylon bags, carry these bags in their knapsacks, and walk. Gradually they took the initiative to put gasoline in bamboo stems and in barrels and to float them on river currents to their destinations. This way of conveyance was disperse but less risky than by tankers because of the feverish attacks by enemy planes along the Truòng Son. A machine gun bullet or a pellet could set the whole tanker in flames. (p.62)

During the years following 1965, North Viêt Nam was still faced with great economic and technical difficulties to start the building of a North-South pipeline. In stores for materials there were only about 200 km of pipes and technicians (p.62) for the laying of the line were not available, particularly for a line thousands of kilometers long. Then the engineering plants in Hanoi (Hà Nôi) (particularly the medium-scale plants and the Trân Hung Dao plant) were ordered to make pipes and priming pumps suitable for use in [the mountain range of] Truòng Son. And the operation of the pipe line was organized; qualified technicians all over North Viêt Nam were recruited; the first army unit of Truòng Son oil-and-gasoline workers came into being. They went to Truòng Son to explore the terrain, not following the trail opened by the Army Corps 559. They found the track for the line by themselves, carrying out a new exploration. Topographical surveys and maps for the laying of pipes were sent to the North for approval and the fabrication of pipes and priming pumps were stepped up.> (p.63)

["U.S." monkey military spies are searching the gasoline pipe line - beginning of operating on August 25, 1968]

<In these three years, the US intelligence center frantically searched for the nascent existence of a pipeline bringing fuel from the North to the South. It had a thick file of hundreds of air photographs showing dim lines and places suspected to be pumping stations and gasoline stores. Some of its assumptions were convincing; others were quite accurate. For instance, it affirmed that 20 km away from Vinh (the provincial capital of Nghê An) in the North-west, a 30 km long portion of the pipe line had been laid down from Ho Chi Minh's native place to the mountains and forests of Truòng Son and that it was completed in August 1968. On August 25, 1968 the pipe line actually began operating.> (p.63)

[The pipeline staff are also farmers]

<What the US-puppet intelligence center could not grasp was that the soldiers who operated oil pumping machines were also engaged in rearing hogs [pigs], cultivating rice and potatoes, and defending the line. With only a few thousand technicians, metal and hydro dynamic workers at the beginning, the young oil-and-gasoline branch had managed within six years to achieve in February 1974 a pipe line starting from Nam Dàn District, Nghê An Province, to Sông Bé Province (now Bình Duong and Bình Phuóc Provinces) in Nam Bô, all along the Truòng Son Range. The 5,000 km long pipeline was ready to supply fuel to the Ho Chi Minh military campaign. Moreover, hundreds of gasoline stores and pumping stations were also completed.> (p.64)

[3 systems of HCM Trail bring the victory in 1975]

<Withing 30 years, the strategic Ho Chi Minh Trail had come into being with these systems:
-- the motor way system
-- the path way system for the movement of troops [with the tunnel systems], and
-- the oil pipe line system. (p.64)

It contributed considerably to bringing about the April 1975 victory, the complete liberation of South Viêt Nam, and the unification of the country.> (p.64)

[Reasons for the "U.S." defeat of the "monkeys"]

<We can conclude that the US defeat in Viêt Nam in general, and in Truòng Son in particular, when it tried to destroy the Ho Chi Minh Trail, stems from the failure of the [racist and arrogant] White House strategists to correctly estimate the determination of Viêt Nam to (p.65) liberate the South and to unify the country, by any means and at any cost. The origin of the Ho Chi Minh Trail was part of this determination. (p.66)

The Truòng Son communication line or the Ho Chi Minh Trail is the embodiment of Resolution Nº 063 dated 8 September 1966 of the Permanent Central Military Commission:

"The line 559 is the most crucial, the most strategically important line of support for South Viêt Nam and our friends, in the immediate and in the distant future." (p.66)

In implementing the Resolution, the Truòng Son Military Command led the troops according to the guiding principle: "the principal means is motorized transport, used in combination with rudimentary means." The Vietnamese principle "attack, defend, and avoid" was used to foil the enemy.> (p.66)

["U.S." spy work - some remarks of the "monkeys"]

<Naturally the war machinery of the [racist and arrogant] Pentagon and the Saigon puppet administration had made a great deal of effort to find out the features of the strategic route of North Viêt Nam. The following are some of their remarks.

[Spy work of the monkey "U.S.A." 4 August 1965: weapons of Vietcong coming from China and Russia now]

<McNamara's 4 August 1965 report to the Defense Sub-committee of the US Senate appropriations commission writes:

"In 1963, a major part of the weapons introduced from North Viêt Nam to the South was French and US weapons acquired before 1954 in Indochina and Korea. Now the armaments brought to South Viêt Nam are the latest infantry weapons produced in Soviet Russia and Communist China. Their quantity is so large (p.66) that all units of the main forces may be reequipped. In 1963 all the cadres and soldiers infiltrated through Laos were South Vietnamese previously regrouped to the North. They had been trained and equipped in North Viêt Nam and ordered to return to South Viêt Nam. Over the next 18 months, the greater part of the infiltrators (over 10,000 men) were North Vietnamese. Last December one to two regiments of a North Vietnamese regular division (Division 325) were introduced through Laos. These units have been deployed in the plateau region of Central South Viêt Nam to coordinate fighting with the Vietcong.> (p.67)

[Spy work of the monkey "U.S.A." 17 December 1965: road net of HCM Trail supplies 2/3 of South Vietnam military needs]

<In the December 17, 1965 issue of "Time" magazine, an article called "More Troublesome Trail" quoted General Creighton Abrams, the Vice Chief of Staff of the US Army and the commanding general of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Viêt Nam (MACV), as saying

"The road net can now move sufficient supplies to meet the requirements of all North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces in the northern two-thirds of South Viet Nam." (p.67)

(in: Time magazine: more Troublesome Trail; 17 December 1965; Internet: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,834778,00.html (3 July 2008)

[Example: Plei Me battle]

<The article further asserted that this was shown through the intense fighting that occurred during the last month around Plei Me in South Viet Nam, where the North Vietnamese battled the U.S. 1st Cavalry and used extensive supplies of ammunition.> (p.67)

It states:

"Americans in Laos believe that it would take three full U.S. divisions to stem the flow of men and material from North Viet Nam. (Another two would be needed to block South Viet Nam's narrow upper neck at the 17th parallel). Eventually, the U.S. may well have to come to Laos' rescue if it is to win the war in South Viet Nam."> U(p.68)

(in: Time magazine: more Troublesome Trail; 17 December 1965; Internet: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,834778,00.html (3 July 2008)

[Spy work of the monkey "U.S.A.": plan 34A against Vietnam - mentioning infiltration and "jungle tracks"]

Under the plan coded 34A (US secret military plan against North Viêt Nam), the activities envisaged for 1964 were listed in detail:
-- spying flights over North Viêt Nam by U2 planes
-- kidnapping North Vietnamese citizens to get information,
-- parachuting commandos and psychological war agents to North Viêt Nam
-- surprise attacks from the sea
-- sabotage of railways, bridges and culverts [little tunnels]
-- shelling [bombing and shooting] of coastal equipment by patrol boats
-- attacks against North Laos and the Ho Chi Minh Trail by the Lao Royal Air Force.

The Lao Royal Air Force has 30-40 T28 propelled bombers but most of the pilots were Americans, only a few were Lao. All were put under the control of US Ambassador Leonard Anger resident in Laos. The same "Time" article also writes:

"Since 1959, the 800-mile labyrinth of jungle tracks, muddy rivers and bamboo way stations within Laotian territory has been the major route south for some 45,000 Communist infiltrators heading to battle in South Viet Nam. The infiltration now comes to an estimated 4,500 "bo doi" (regular infantry men) a month. More than one third of the "trail" has been converted into broad-shouldered (p.68), two-lane dirt highways... several thousand North Vietnamese soldiers are now permanently stationed in the Laotian "panhandle" to keep the route secure."> (p.69)

(in: Time magazine: more Troublesome Trail; 17 December 1965; Internet: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,834778,00.html (3 July 2008)

[Monkey "U.S." command only sees a labyrinth]

<The war machinery in the Pentagon is well aware of the role played by the strategic transport corridor called "the Ho Chi Minh Trail". But as it is described in a study on this trail, it constitutes "a labyrinth across thick forests, an impregnable and most secure secret zone of the Vietcong."> (p.69)

This is the conclusion of the US [racist and arrogant monkey] Defense Department on [concerning] the network of roads in the Truòng Son Range.> (p.69)

[Monkey "U.S.A." means that Ho Chi Minh Trail would only be one road]

<In total, Americans only knew that the Ho Chi Minh Trail started from Hanoi (Hà Nôi) and went to Laos by the Mua Gia Pass, then it went down to Shapone to reach the Dà Nang region. IN view of these facts and details, the US could only carry out indiscriminate bombings on the Truòng Son Range and be resigned to a newer discovery (perhaps the only accurate one) that "the Vietnamese never followed the habitual road-way; they also never (p.107) chose the large highways. All the newly constructed lines are across mountains and forests and hey are impenetrable." (p.108)

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